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Resumo
O Conflito Russo-Ucraniano: Lições para os Euro-
peus na Ótica Polaca
O corrente conflito russo-ucraniano alterou nova-
mente o destino da Europa do Leste. No entanto, 
esta crise deve também ser considerada como um 
fator perturbador da segurança Europeia. Toda a 
arquitetura da segurança Europeia foi afetada com 
a instabilidade do flanco oriental do continente. Se 
este conflito não servir como um fator unificador da 
comunidade transatlântica, poderá ser um prenún-
cio de difíceis tempos vindouros. Acresce, ainda, 
que este perigo poder-se-á tornar particularmente 
grave caso se instale a perceção de que a NATO per-
deu a sua credibilidade para dissuadir ameaças e a 
União Europeia a sua capacidade como potência 
normativa para estimular mudanças no sistema 
internacional. Inicialmente, este artigo apresenta 
cinco lições fundamentais que deverão ser retiradas 
do conflito russo-ucraniano de forma a conter even-
tuais desafios e ameaças para a Europa. Posterior-
mente, serão abordadas quatro recomendações que 
constituem uma base para um plano de ação de 
políticas securitárias sólidas e de longo prazo como 
resposta a este conflito.
Abstract
The current Russian-Ukrainian conflict has once again 
altered the fate of Eastern Europe. Yet, it should be also 
considered as a game changer for European security. 
The entire European security architecture has trembled 
as the eastern flank of the continent has been desta-
bilised. If the conflict cannot act as a unifier for the 
transatlantic community, it could well spell tougher 
times down the road. This danger would become par-
ticularly acute if the perception takes hold that NATO 
has lost its credibility to deter threats and the EU has 
lost its ability to be a normative power which stimu-
lates changes in the international environment. Firstly, 
this article presents five fundamental lessons-learned 
that must be drawn from the Russian-Ukrainian con-
flict in order to contain the potential future challenges 
and threats for Europe. Secondly, it offers four recom-
mendations which constitute a sound basis for a con-
crete and long-term security policy action plan in 
response to the conflict.
* The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.
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In 2013, Eastern Europe was on its path to fade to oblivion. For some Western coun-
tries it has become an “unwanted child” being neither a source of political and 
economic successes nor a strategic security policy nuisance. It was more convenient 
to assume that the status quo will prevail. Some have fallen into this strategic trap; 
others have warned that history in Easter Europe has not yet ended. “The West’s 
willingness to consider security issues in Eastern Europe as second-tier is pre ma-
ture. There is one more important factor co-defining the situation in the region: 
Russia. Unfortunately, its role cannot always be described as constructive. A turnin g 
point in Russia’s policy towards Eastern Europe was undoubtedly the 2008 war 
with Georgia and the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Osseti a. The conflict confirmed that Russia has set its own ‘red lines’ in Eastern 
Europe, and recognised the area as lying within its ‘zone of privileged inte-
rests’”(Jankowski and Świeżak, 2014).
The current Russian-Ukrainian conflict has once again altered the fate of Eastern 
Europe. Yet, it should be also considered as a game changer for European security 
as the forgotten notion of war was restored into the political discourse. The entire 
European security architecture has trembled as the eastern flank of the continent 
has been destabilised. If the conflict cannot act as a unifier for the transatlantic com-
munity, it could well spell tougher times down the road. This danger would become 
particularly acute if the perception takes hold that NATO has lost its credibility to 
deter threats and the EU has lost its ability to be a normative power which stimu-
lates changes in the international environment.
Five Lessons-Learned
From a Polish perspective, five fundamental lessons-learned must be drawn from 
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in order to contain the potential future challenges 
and threats for the Old Continent.
Firstly, this conflict has confirmed that Eastern Europe remains a volatile space. In 
fact, Europe received its first wake-up call in 2008 during the Russian-Georgian 
war. As identified by Ronald D. Asmus (2010: 215) “the Russo-Georgian war of 
August 2008 was a little war that shook the world. It shocked a West that had 
become com placent in its belief that war in Europe had become a think of the past 
and thus ignored the warning signs that conflict was brewing between Moscow 
and Tbilisi”.
However, the negative trends stemming from the Middle East and North Africa – 
being both direct and indirect consequences of the Arab Spring – have led many 
Western countries to simply forget about Eastern Europe. In reality, the belt of insta-
bility stretching from the Caucasus to Transnistria never disappeared. Indeed, the 
regional security vacuum has triggered more assertiveness. The protracted conflicts 
render the strategic situation even more fragile. In Georgia, the Russian occupation 
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of about one-fifth of Georgian territory continues. In reality, Russia has not ceased 
to further illegally incorporate both Abkhazia and South Ossetia into its own poli-
tical, economic and security system. On November 24, 2014, a Russian-Abkhazian 
treaty on alliance and strategic partnership was signed, despite Abkhazia not being 
recognised as a state by the international community.
Under this treaty, Abkhazia, which still retains a semblance of independence, will 
be integrated with Russia in the areas of: defence, border control, customs policy, 
social policy and law and order. A united Russian-Abkhazian grouping of troops, 
consisting of units from both countries which will be deployed in Abkhazia, is to be 
formed within one year of signing the treaty. In peacetime, the command will 
rotate, and in wartime the commander will be appointed by Russia. “The treaty 
also provides for a gradual unification of military standards, joint protection of 
Abkhazian borders (in practice, the border with Georgia) and the free movement of 
people through the Abkhazian-Russian border. A Joint Information and Coordi-
nation Centre of the law enforcement agencies dealing with internal affairs will be 
created in two years’ time in order to coordinate actions aimed at combating crime” 
(Falkowski, 2014). Moreover, Azerbaijan and Armenia have carried on a bloody 
conflict over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.
In July 2014, the killing of fifteen Azerbaijani soldiers along the “line of contact” 
signified an escalation in hostilities. Casualties from retaliatory action, Azeri mul-
tiple-rocket launcher fire and overflights by the Azerbaijani Air Force indicated 
that the situation might deteriorate. However, the hostilities may not be acciden-
tal. In fact, “Armenia is a faithful Russian ally. It rejected an Association Agree-
ment with the European Union it painstakingly negotiated for three years, and 
signed up for membership in the Moscow-led Customs Union. Russian military 
bases remain on the Armenian territory through 2043, and Russian troops guard 
Armenia’s borders with Iran and Turkey. Moreover, Armenia voted in support of 
Russia in the UN General Assembly regarding the annexation of Crimea. It may 
use Russia’s action towards the peninsula as a model for occupation and annexa-
tion of Karabakh” (Cohen, 2014). Finally, the illegal stationing of a Russian contin-
gent in Transnistria with neither a United Nations mandate nor Moldovan consent 
completes the picture. Moldova has already been subject to an extraordinary 
degree of blackmail and threats by Russia. Just before Moldova signed the EU’s 
Association Agreement in 2013, “Russia launched a vitriolic campaign against the 
EU inside Moldova. It also threatened to impose several kinds of trade embargoes 
on a country that has been heavily dependent on Russia for its energy, trade and 
labour market for migrant workers” (Dempsey, 2014). Recently, Russia has also 
interfered into the region of Gagauzia in which the Turkic-speaking community 
has become increasingly pro-Russian and more vocal about a greater autonomy, if 
not independence from Moldova.
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Secondly, Winston Churchill was wrong when he depicted Russia as “a riddle 
w rapped in a mystery inside an enigma”. Russia has unfortunately confirmed its 
predictable status of a revisionist power. Its principal foreign policy goal is to main-
tain Eastern Europe in Russia’s sphere of influence by stopping, or at least hamper-
ing, the political aspirations of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to strengthen their 
ties with both the EU and NATO. The other goal is to influence or even intimidate 
some EU and NATO members and to put into question the Western political system 
based on democracy and the rule of law. To achieve these ends, Moscow has reached 
for hybrid warfare. In fact, the tools thus far applied by Russia in its conflict with 
Ukraine come from different centuries: the use of pure military force: the nineteenth 
century; breach of international law and the use of propaganda: the twentieth cen-
tury; and, finally, political and economic pressure, combined with new instruments 
such as cyber-attacks: twenty-first century.
Hybrid warfare has been an effective and sometimes surprising mix of military and 
non-military as well as conventional and irregular components. The Russian hybrid 
approach to conflicts has become even more prominent with an extensive use of 
their Special Operations Forces (“little green men”), security forces and intelligence 
agencies, as well as Russian-speaking minorities, as tools. Indeed, “none of the sin-
gle components is new; it is the combination and orchestration of different actions 
that achieves a surprising effect and creates ambiguity, making an adequate reac-
tion extremely difficult, especially for international organizations that operate on 
the principle of consensus” (Golts and Reisinger, 2014: 3). In fact, to the current 
Russian approach five elements seem key: the actions with an appearance of lega-
lity, military show of force and readiness, “little green men”, taking advantage of 
local tensions and local militias as well as propaganda. Moreover, with hybrid 
warfa re techniques, ones shortfalls can be compensated. At the same time, these 
instruments allow optimal exploitation of the opponent’s vulnerabilities. There-
fore, “Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine demonstrated the new capabilities of the 
Russian armed forces, following the military reform launched in 2008: enhanced 
deployability (tactical and strategic airlift), a relatively high level of training and 
professional forces” (Golts and Reisinger, 2014: 10)
Furthermore, Russia as a revisionist power, seeks to secure its military might and 
signals its readiness to use conventional forces just as easily as it does other, softer 
means. In the past decade its military capability significantly rose and its defence 
budget is to grow even further. The decision to increase military expenditure and 
its share of GDP dates back to late 2008. After the war with Georgia, it was decided 
to undertake a far-reaching reform of the armed forces and to accelerate their 
re-equi pment with new armaments. In 2013, Russia’s defence spending increased 
by 4.8 percent in real terms, and its military burden exceeded that of the US for the 
first time since 2003. “Russia’s spending has risen as it continues to implement the 
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State Armaments Plan for 2011–20, under which it plans to spend 20.7 trillion 
ro ubles (EUR 574 billion) on new and upgraded armaments. The goal is to replace 
70 percent of equipment with ‘modern’ weapons by 2020” (Perlo-Freeman and 
Solmi rano, 2014: 2).
A creeping militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast, the Crimean Peninsula and 
areas near the borders of the Baltic States, as well as forward basing in Belarus, pose 
a major threat to the stability of the vicinity of the EU and NATO. The redeploy-
ment in December 2013 of Russian fighter jets to Belarus has political significance 
above all. Indeed, “it should be seen as a symbolic counterbalance to the NATO 
Baltic Air Policing mission which has been in place since 2004 and consists of air-
craft from different NATO member countries (mostly Poland) taking turns to guard 
the airspace of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia” (Wilk, 2013). From a military pers-
pective, the practical dimension will be the training of Russian pilots in terms of 
potential (future) flights in Belarusian airspace.
Finally, since the Russian annexation of Crimea, the intensity and gravity of inci-
dents involving Russian and Western militaries and security agencies has visibly 
increased. Compared with the pre-March 2014 period, “the situation has changed 
both with regards to the number of relevant incidents, and their gravity. Concernin g 
the numbers, NATO officials indicated in late October 2014 that this year NATO 
states have already conducted over 100 intercepts of Russian aircraft, three times 
more than in 2013” (Frear, Kearn and Kulesa, 2014: 1).
Thirdly, Russia has five major allies in the Western world: a growing anti-Ameri-
canism in Europe, lack of knowledge about Eastern Europe, fear of conflict, 
econo mic interests and anti-liberalism. In fact, a dangerous mixture of political, 
economic and social factors weakens the ability of Western elites to take bold, 
strategic decisions which go beyond an electoral cycle. Having this in mind, 
R ussia has smartly used its trump card to consolidate its gains in Eastern Ukraine, 
achieve a growing leverage over the West’s ability to move towards political con-
frontation again as well as put the blame on the West. In this context, some 
W estern experts even claim that “the United States and its European allies share 
most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO 
enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of 
R ussia’s orbit and integrate into the West. Putin’s pushback should have come as 
no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and 
threatening its core strategic interests, a point that Putin made emphatically and 
repeatedly. […] There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however – although it 
would require the West to think about the country in a fundamentally new way. 
The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine 
and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, akin to 
Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge 
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that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian 
regime there” (Mearsheimer, 2014).
Fourthly, defence still matters. Until very recently, one of the best deterrents for 
small- and medium-sized states – provided they could not join NATO, the EU, or 
both – was embedded in international law and diplomatic tools. However, the 
e rosion or even the blatant breach of international legal commitments (the 1987 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the 1990 Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the 1997 
NATO-Russia Founding Act, the 1999 adapted CFE Treaty) has severely under-
mined their deterrent character.
In its latest annual report on arms control compliance, the US State Department 
formally accused Russia of having violated the INF Treaty. The basic allegation is 
that Russia breached its obligations not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-
launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range of between 500 km and 5,500 km (the 
“Prohibited Range”) or to possess or produce associated launchers (United States 
of America State Department, 2014: 12). “The primary reason that Russia would 
seek to deploy a new GLCM is to enhance its war-fighting capabilities in the 
Eu ropean theater. Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine continues to identify NATO 
(especially the prospect for further NATO enlargement) as a continuing source of 
potential military danger for the Russian Federation. In addressing this challenge, 
a new intermediate-range GLCM would provide Russia with important additional 
capabilities” (Schwarz, 2014). In fact, the new GLCM could also give Russia the 
means of delivering nuclear attacks in vital parts of Europe. Russian doctrine has 
long envisioned use of nuclear weapons as an integral part of Russia’s war-fighting 
strategy in Europe, as they are viewed as a means to compensate for a weaker 
po sition of Russia’s conventional military.
Taking into consideration the erosion or violation of international legal commit-
ments, military instruments still remain valid in Europe in the twenty-first century 
and the effective diplomatic tools that European countries have had at their dis-
posal need to be strengthened by necessary military potential. Europe should once-
again be able to negotiate out of a position of strength. The well-known phrase 
“trust but verify” needs to apply again.
Finally, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict created a pivotal moment for European 
security. Russia’s challenge to a rules-based order reached its highest point since 
the end of the Cold War with the seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014. 
The security conditions in Central and Eastern Europe have considerably worse-
ned. The European security architecture, which was inclusive and in fact co-created 
by Russia, has been changed. Therefore, a revisionist Russia can hardly be treated 
as a “strategic partner” anymore, at least for the foreseeable future. This privilege 
should be reserved only for those countries which do not put at risk the health of 
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the liberal international order based on democracy, self-determination, the rule of 
law, market economy, free trade, respect for human rights and effectively on mutual 
trust. The existence of this order must not be taken for granted and needs to be 
protected and defended. In recent years, Russia has constantly challenged the 
West’s global geopolitical interests by establishing a close cooperation with other 
authoritarian regimes (especially Belarus, China, Iran, Sudan and Syria) and there-
fore further destabilising the world order (e.g. by fuelling the war in Syria).
At least for now “Russia has made clear that it intends to be a rule-breaker, nor a 
rule-maker, casting doubt on its readiness to play a helpful role in forging a new 
normative consensus between established and emerging powers” (Kupchan, 2014: 
163-164). In fact, over the next months and years the West’s unity will likely be 
tested and undermined by Russia. If successfully, other rising powers – especially 
Brazil, China, India and Iran – might see Western inaction as an incentive to foster 
their own alternative visions of world order.
Four Policies
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict cannot be solved by tactical, ad hoc measures which 
for the West seem more convenient as they are less costly from a political and eco-
nomic perspective. However, it would not be sensible if European policymakers 
decided to resolve the tensions between sustainable economic policy and security 
policy exclusively in favour of the former. Therefore, Europe needs to forge a con-
crete, united and long-term action plan in response to the current conflict. Four 
recommendations for Europeans come to the fore.
First, Europeans must embrace a “Ukraine first” policy which should be trans-
lated into a more proactive, balanced and sustainable approach to the neighbour-
hood policy in general. The stabilisation of eastern and southern Ukraine, based 
among others on the fifteen-point plan for the peaceful settlement of the crisis 
presented by President Petro Poroshenko as well as the Minsk Protocol, remains 
a prerequisite for any further steps. Russia must stop fuelling the conflict by 
wi thdrawing its forces from Ukraine and from the Russian-Ukrainian border, as 
well as by stopping financial and military support to the separatists. Simulta-
neously, the EU and the United States, along with the International Monetary 
Fund, should continue to support Ukraine economically, which could constitute 
the best incentive for Kyiv to implement the necessary reforms (monetary and 
fiscal policy, energy market, financial and security sectors). In fact, Ukraine has 
untapped growth potential: “Ukraine has fertile agricultural land, an attractive 
geogra phical location in Europe, bordering the European Union (the largest mar-
ket in the world), and a large domestic market of almost 46 million consumers. It 
also has abundant natural resources, relatively well-developed infrastructure, 
high quality human capital, and a significant industrial base. However, Ukraine’s 
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potential has yet to be adequately harnessed. Defying expectations at the time of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, when hopes that the newly found indepen-
dence would spur Ukraine’s development loomed large, the country’s GDP per 
capita still lingers below 1989 levels and at a mere 10 percent of the European 
Union average after twenty years of transition. Incomes have increased much 
more slowly in Ukraine than in the Europe and Central Asia region as a whole. 
Ukraine has also been under-performing relative to regional peers, such as 
Poland, Ro mania, Russia and Belarus, especially during the recent global crisis, 
registe ring a decline in GDP by 15 percent in 2009” (World Bank, 2014: 10). 
F urthermore, the Association Agreement with the EU could provide an impor-
tant anchor for the reform process. Implementation of the Association Agree-
ment, together with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement, 
could provide consi derable benefits for Ukraine. EU accession had such an effect 
e arlier for the new EU members in Central and East Europe, which took advan-
tage of the intimate engagement with the EU to increase exports, attract FDI, 
enhance competition, minimize the negative influence of vested interests, and 
ultimately make an unprecedented step towards catching up with the West. The 
entrance of the EU agreements into full force would create legally binding obli-
gations for the harmonization of Ukraine’s laws with the regulatory architecture 
of the EU’s single market.
Moreover, the importance of the driving force that could change the long-term fate 
of Ukraine – its politically conscious and proactive civil society – should not be 
overlooked. Democracy promoters and local activists need to focus on society itself. 
“Good NGO work is crucial for the quality of public space. It defines the culture of 
public debate and holds governments accountable. The defining principle of their 
work should be to ensure a two-way relationship with society. Whatever choice 
civil society leaders make, it is crucial that they remain independent. NGOs would 
benefit from shifting their outlook from one limited to the issues of the Helsinki 
Declaration and human rights to one that encompasses economic justice, access to 
services and consumer protection” (Lutsevych, 2013: 17).
Finally, Crimea needs to be returned to Ukraine. Some may argue that this geo-
graphic peninsula is practically gone, but not by international legal standards. In 
fact, “the unlawfulness of acts committed by the Russian Federation in Crimea 
leading to Ukraine’s loss of effective territorial control over the Peninsula gives 
rise to conclusion that, under international law, Crimea remains an integral part 
of Ukraine’s territory under Russian occupation” (Republic of Poland, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2014: 7). If it is not returned, the Ukrainian government – with 
the necessary support from the West – should prepare a detailed account of what 
proper ty has been seized and present this case at an international court (e.g. the 
International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea). 
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Individual Ukrainians, who lost their property in Crimea, should also go to the 
court. In fact, a creation of a special tribunal – based on the experiences gathered 
by the still existing Iran-United States Claims Tribunal – should also not be 
excluded.
Second, Europeans must understand that there can be “no business as usual” 
with Russia. Should this lesson already have not been learnt following the 
Russia-Georgia war in 2008? Russia has become an unreliable, irresponsible and 
a revisionist power. Indeed, “Russia today is more autocratic internally and more 
aggressive toward its neighbours than at any time since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Official propaganda paints the West as an enemy and 
actively tries to undermine unity in the EU and coherence in the transatlantic 
allian ce” (Speck, 2014). Therefore, the Western community should be ready to 
impose additional political and economic sanctions if further destabilisation 
occurs. The sanctions signal the West’s readiness to confront Russia and show 
that the West is ready to pay a price in terms of the partial interruption of its eco-
nomic interaction with Russia.
Furthermore, the European countries should stop all transfer of military techno-
logy to Russia, including those ongoing or suspended, as well as reduce Russian 
dominance over European energy markets. Moreover, the West must strategically 
reassess its relations with Russia. In 1967, the “Harmel Report” reasserted NATO’s 
basic principles and introduced a two-track strategy of deterrence and dialogue. 
Under the current circumstances, the West – especially NATO – needs a similar 
intellectual exercise to build consensus on the relationship with Russia which has 
been fundamentally altered. Agreeing to establish a high-level commission tasked 
with developing recommendations on how to re-engage Moscow diplomatically 
will prevent NATO, and more broadly the West, from reaching premature con-
clusions (one of them being Russia’s willingness to return to the currently under-
mined international legal framework) (Bunde, Jankowski and Michelot, 2014). 
Finally, as in the Ukrainian case, the prime mover of the necessary transformation 
of Russia might stem from its civil society. Therefore, its strength could be reinvigo-
rated by promoting an independent Russian-speaking media.
Third, NATO is back. Following the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, there exists a 
unique opportunity for the Alliance to demonstrate its full and continued commit-
ment to Article 5. The NATO summit in Wales addressed a new security reality. The 
Alliance has started to refocus on its core mission: securing peace through defence 
and deterrence. Indeed, NATO must be strategically enhanced, especially its ea stern 
flank. Therefore, “in order to ensure that our Alliance is ready to respond swiftly 
and firmly to the new security challenges, today we have approved the NATO 
Readiness Action Plan. It provides a coherent and comprehensive package of neces-
sary measures to respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO’s 
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borders and further afield that are of concern to Allies. It responds to the challenges 
posed by Russia and their strategic implications. It also responds to the risks and 
threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North 
Africa. The Plan strengthens NATO’s collective defence. It also strengthens our 
crisi s management capability. The Plan will contribute to ensuring that NATO 
remains a strong, ready, robust, and responsive Alliance capable of meeting current 
and future challenges from wherever they may arise” (North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization, 2014). Consequently, the strengthening of the eastern flank will be reached 
by conducting regular military exercises in Central and Eastern Europe which 
actual forces participate, and which encompass all potential scenarios, including 
Article 5 ones. Moreover, the NATO Response Force will be transformed into a 
more accessible and agile instrument with a robust delivery capability which will 
enhance its responsiveness. This rapid response capability (Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force) will focus on speed, providing NATO leaders with a credible and 
easily deployable asset to match sudden threats along NATO’s periphery. This 
force should consist of a land component with appropriate air, maritime and spe-
cial operations forces available. Readiness of elements of the VJTF will be tested 
through short-notice exercises. NATO will also establish an appropriate command 
and control presence and some in-place force enablers on the territories of eastern 
Allies. Furthermore, a strategic enhancement of the eastern flank will cover both 
infrastructure – including a proper high readiness command on the basis of the 
Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin and equipment storage sites preposi-
tioned for arrival of major forces in the case of conflict – as well as ‘boots on the 
ground’. In addition, NATO could in the future introduce the standing defence 
plans which would be a more precise extension of the contingency plans. Finally, 
Europeans should be more responsive to the ongoing US requests to reverse the 
negative trends in military spending (2 percent of GDP needs to remain not only a 
rule of thumb, but stricter roadmaps to reach that should be developed). In fact, in 
Wales the allies agreed to halt any decline in defence expenditure, increase defence 
spending in real terms as GDP grows as well as aim to move towards the 2 percent 
guideline within a decade.
Fourth, “if you want peace, prepare for war”. Europeans need to consider rearma-
ment. And luckily there seem to be a few good harbingers on the horizon with 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania or Norway, to name a few, where mili-
tary expenditures are set to grow. Particularly Poland, being a responsible ally, has 
recently given a constructive example. Based on a solid financial foundation, i.e. a 
legal obligation to spend 1.95 percent of GDP on defence, Poland has paved the 
way towards a robust modernisation programme (with particular emphasis on air 
and missile defence, land forces, naval forces, information technology and helicop-
ters). Indeed, with an objective to spend at least twenty percent of its growing 
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budget on procurements, and thanks to the recent announcement of its military 
budget increase to at least 2 percent of GDP in 2016, Poland is fast becoming one of 
the frontrunners of European military strength.
If one could name one unique novel element in the Polish strategy, it would be the 
recurrence of deterrence. Once a backbone of many national security strategies, with 
time it has almost vanished from the vocabulary of strategic debate. Yet, from a Polish 
perspective this concept has not become obsolete, as it provides a viable solution to 
the current strategic problems. Indeed, deterrence is a strategy for addressing two 
competing goals: countering a potential enemy or threat, and avoiding war. Poland 
must act as “the expectations of behaviour that undergirded the pre-Ukraine war 
status quo have already been altered: Russia has demonstrated its will and capability 
to use force to redraw the map of the region. The credibility of the West has also been 
altered, and to be precise, diminished” (Grygiel and Mitchell, 2014).
The goal of the “Polish Fangs” initiative, announced in 2013, is to develop the essential 
military capabilities necessary to implement a deterrence strategy. In practice, “Polish 
Fangs” will be comprised of cruise missiles for both the F-16 fleet and potentially the 
conventional submarines, combat drones, special operations forces, as well as the 
Po lish Navy Coastal Defense Missile Battalion system. Moreover, it is likely that this 
project will be supplemented by both defensive and offensive cyber-weapons, as 
cyber-defence capabilities will become a priority in the next strategic planning cycle.
Currently, only two pillars of the deterrence strategy are operational. First, the special 
operations forces, which have become an undisputable flagship of the Polish Armed 
Forces and their professionalization. Second, the Coastal Defense Missile Battalion that 
became operational in June 2013. Ultimately, it will be equipped with 48 Norwegian 
Naval Strike Missiles, which can serve both as an anti-ship and a land-attack weapon.
Another particularly noteworthy undertaking is the acquisition of the cruise missiles 
for the F-16 fleet. Following the example of Finland, Poland in December 2014 signed 
a deal to purchase 40 advanced Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) from 
the United States. The deal also includes associated equipment, training and logisti-
cal support needed to make them operational. Delivery is to take place in 2015 and 
2016, and the missiles are scheduled to be operational in 2017. The combination of 
F-16 fighters and semi-stealthy missiles will provide a new and important capability 
for the Polish deterrence strategy. In fact, the transaction will be much more than an 
arms deal – it will have, as was the case in Finland, significant political and regional 
military implications.
The “Polish Fangs” initiative, along with the air and missile defense system, will 
provide Poland with game-changing capabilities. They should be perceived as a 
good example of the leading edge of so-called anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) sys-
tems, which are raising the costs for potential adversaries to project power and pur-
sue their objectives (Jankowski, 2013).
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Conclusion
Establishing a rules-based order for the 21st century depends on the West’s ability 
to recover its economic and political strength, enabling to continue serving as the 
world’s anchor of liberal values and practices. However, it does not mean that the 
military aspect should be overlooked.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has confirmed that most Europeans have been proven 
wrong in their assessments as they have become intellectually and emo tionally 
dependent on wishful thinking, namely that they no longer had to worry about their 
own security and Moscow’s actions, even if Russia fell far short of Eu ropean demo-
cratic standards. The real difficulty in finding Russia a place and role within Europe’s 
security architecture is Moscow’s continuing preoccupation with its great power sta-
tus and its pursuit of hegemony in the post-Soviet space. The European integration 
process has been designed in order to constrain and contain the influence of major 
powers within supranational organizations.
Moreover, the world will neither be safer nor more just if Europe disarms. On the 
contrary, future generations of European citizens would likely face an international 
environment less amenable to both their socio-economic and security needs.
As Ulrich Speck rightly underlines “the easiest way for the EU to get out of the 
confrontation with Russia would be to disengage from the post-Soviet space and 
seal NATO’s external border. But that would be short-sighted. In such a scenario, 
there would likely be permanent, low-level conflict and warfare in Eastern Europe, 
as the countries in the region are not ready to accept full submission to Moscow. 
They have developed their own identity and aspirations since the fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Russia, for its part, would likely turn into an even more revisionist, 
imperialist-minded, aggressive, and militarized power. It would be an illusion to 
think that the EU could be safe and prosperous in such a neighbourhood” (Speck, 
2014). Only by stepping up engagement, by helping countries such as Ukraine, to 
stabilize, and by enlarging the sphere of liberal democracy and market economy 
can the West bring the post-Soviet space closer to the postmodern multilateral 
order.
In 2014, Europe received a second wake-up call – a chance that must not be missed. 
Anyone who fails to see this is strategically blind.
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